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Climate	change	and	the	economics	of	REDD	through	an	efficiency-equity	lens	
	
	
	
E	J	Z	Robinson,	S	Somerville,	H	J	Albers	
	
1 Introduction	Though	REDD,	“reduced	emissions	from	deforestation	and	forest	degradation”,	has	promised	much	for	climate	change	mitigation,	for	forests,	and	for	lower-income	countries,	criticisms	of	the	incentive	mechanisms	in	a	context	of	ill-defined	property	rights	and	the	incidence	of	burdens	and	benefits	abound.	Indeed,	a	recent	article	has	suggested	that	“furtive	whispers	…	REDD+	is	dead…”	(Fletcher	et	al.,	2016).	REDD	has	proven	complicated,	costly	to	implement,	controversial,	and	arguably	ineffective	in	achieving	its	aims	of	reducing	GHG	emissions	(Dyer	and	Counsell,	2010).	The	distributional	impact	of	REDD	is	increasingly	voiced	as	a	concern:	who	benefits	and	who	is	harmed	by	the	introduction	of	a	REDD	initiative;	who	dictates	the	“rules	of	the	game”;	who	has	the	rights	to	sequestered	carbon	and	thus	to	REDD	payments.		In	this	review	article	we	explore	REDD	through	an	economics	lens.	We	highlight	how	the	literature	has	evolved	in	parallel	with	the	evolution	of	REDD.	We	start	with	a	brief	description	of	the	genesis	of	REDD,	its	underlying	rationale,	and	its	origins	in	payments	for	economic	services;	address	the	need	for	rigorous,	and	therefore	costly,	monitoring,	reporting	and	verification;	discuss	the	literature	that	evaluates	REDD	initiatives;	and	review	the	arguments	around	issues	of	equity	and	climate	justice	as	they	complicate	REDD	implementation	and	effectiveness.		REDD	is	controversial.	As	a	market-based	approach	REDD	continues	to	be	questioned	(e.g.	Corbera,	2012;	Redford	et	al.,	2013;	Boucher,	2015)	within	the	broader	discussion	of	whether	market-based	conservation	has	a	future	(Fletcher	et	al.,	2016).	Whilst	some	see	market-based	funding	through	carbon	markets	as	a	low-cost	approach	to	reducing	emissions,	others	see	such	offsetting	as	flawed,	and	object	to	the	commodification	and	marketization	of	standing	forests.	Indeed,	market	mechanisms	have	been	condemned	by	some,	including	the	“climate	justice”	movement.	The	Bolivia	UNFCC	submission	explicitly	condemned	market	mechanisms,	including	REDD	(Long	et	al.,	2010).	A	growing	literature	addresses	REDD	in	the	context	of	climate	justice	that	expresses	concerns,	for	example,	as	to	whether	market-based	approaches	will	benefit	more	powerful	groups	and	harm	indigenous	forest-dependent	peoples	(Okereke	and	Dooley,	2010).	While	we	are	aware	of	the	importance	of	these	debates,	here	we	address	equity	and	efficiency	considerations	as	related	to	the	economics	of	REDD.	The	efficiency	aspects	of	REDD	include	the	gains	in	cost-effectiveness	from	unleashing	the	power	of	markets	to	solve	the	problem	of	under-provision	of	the	public	good	of	carbon	sequestration.		Among	other	things,	those	gains	rely	on	the	ability	to	fully	define	property	rights	and	legal	institutions	to	allow	the	markets	to	function	well.		Creating	
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markets	for	public	goods	always	proves	challenging.	The	difficulties	are	compounded	in	the	LIMC	context	of	complex	but	often	incomplete	institutions	to	support	such	markets.		Further,	in	keeping	with	an	economics	perspective,	this	review	article	addressing	issues	of	equity.	We	consider	the	impact	both	on	and	of	REDD	implementation	with	respect	to	the	distribution	of	benefits	and	costs	across	countries,	across	institutions	within	countries,	and	across	individuals;	the	role	of	compensation	versus	incentive;	and	ancillary	benefits	from	REDD	including	pro-poor	versions	of	implementation.			In	all,	over	300	REDD	projects	have	been	implemented	in	64	countries	under	the	United	Nations	REDD	Pogramme	(Sills	et	al.,	2014;	Rakatama	et	al,	2017).	They	have	been	implemented	in	many	different	ways,	reflecting	differences	in	forest	governance	and	ownership,	and	government	preferences.	As	we	write,	we	recognize	that	there	are	many	review	articles	(for	example,	Agrawal	et	al.,	2011;	Albers	and	Robinson,	2013)	and	books	(for	example,	Angelsen,	2008b	and	2009)	addressing	REDD,	some	of	them	quite	recent.	Our	aim	is	not	to	replicate,	but	rather	to	provide	a	different	perspective	on	the	economics	of	REDD	in	the	literature.		We	first	address	the	origins	of	REDD,	including	its	conceptualization	as	an	international	payment	for	ecosystem	services.	We	then	consider	how	the	implementation	of	REDD	has	been	influenced	by	a	myriad	of	practical	realities	that	are	often	intertwined.	These	include	issues	of	property	rights	and	land	tenure;	the	high	costs	of	setting	up,	monitoring,	and	enforcing	REDD	rules	and	regulations;	and	how	the	costs	and	benefits	associated	with	REDD	are	distributed.		
2 Bringing	LMICs	into	Climate	Policy	Through	Payments	for	Ecosystem	Services		REDD	was	originally	conceived	as	a	classic	PES	–	a	payment	for	the	ecosystem	service	of	avoided	forest	loss.		Through	subsequent	agreements	and	then	through	implementation,	that	conception	has	changed	in	reaction	to	aspects	of	the	settings	that	complicate	market-based	mechanisms,	the	realization	of	higher	than	expected	costs,	and	a	broadening	of	the	goals	of	REDD	including	the	provision	of	ancillary	benefits	for	biodiversity	and/or	poverty	alleviation.			2.1	Origins	of	REDD	At	the	third	Conference	of	the	Parties	(COP)	in	Kyoto,	1997,	higher-income	countries	committed	to	reducing	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	emissions	by	setting	binding	targets	for	“Annex	1	countries”	–	the	37	industrialised	countries	and	the	European	community	(Babiker	et	al.,	2000).		The	Clean	Development	Mechanism,	CDM,	established	under	the	Kyoto	protocol	and	entered	into	force	in	2005,	allowed	Annex	1	countries	to	achieve	compliance	with	the	UNFCCC	(United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change)	by	paying	for	the	reduction	of	emissions	in	non-Annex	1	(lower-income)	countries	(UNFCC,	1997;	Oberthür	and	Ott,	1999;	Shrestha	and	Timilsina,	2002).	Increasing	forest	cover	through	afforestation	and	reforestation	in	lower-income	countries	was	eligible	for	carbon	credits	through	the	CDM.	Thus	lower-income	countries	and	their	forests	were	brought	formally	into	international	climate	talks	and	climate	
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action	only	as	the	providers	of	carbon	storage	benefits	to	offset	emissions	in	other	countries.		At	the	time	that	the	CDM	was	proposed,	forest	loss	was	estimated	to	be	contributing	to	around	one	quarter	of	global	GHG	emissions	(Neeff	and	Ascui,	2009).1	Yet,	avoided	forest	loss	was	not	accommodated	in	the	CDM	(Pedroni	et	al.,	2009).	The	possibility	of	payments	for	reducing	forest	loss,	as	opposed	to	payments	for	increasing	forest	cover	as	covered	by	the	CDM,	was	added	during	the	2007	Bali	climate	change	meetings	(Agrawal	et	al.,	2011,	provide	considerable	detail).	Costa	Rica	and	Papua	New	Guinea	proposed	that	lower-income	countries	should	be	rewarded	through	financial	compensation	for	reducing	their	rates	of	deforestation	relative	to	a	baseline	rate	(Pedroni	et	al.,	2009;	Buizer	et	al.,	2014).	Such	avoided	forest	loss	was	incorporated	first	through	RED,	reduced	emissions	from	deforestation,	and	its	later	manifestation	REDD,	reduced	emissions	from	deforestation	and	forest	degradation.	A	“+”	was	added,	REDD+,	which	expanded	the	concept	of	REDD	to	encompass	considerations	of	conservation,	sustainable	forest	management,	and	afforestation	and	reforestation	(Albers	and	Robinson,	2013),	referred	to	post	Copenhagen	COP	15	as	“Reducing	emissions	from	deforestation	and	forest	degradation	and	the	role	of	conservation,	sustainable	management	of	forests	and	enhancement	of	forest	carbon	stocks	in	developing	countries”	(Cadman	et	al.,	2017).		REDD	provides	an	opportunity	for	LIMCs	that	have	ongoing	forest	loss	to	participate	in	climate	policy	and	agreements	in	a	direct	manner,	rather	than	indirectly	as	through	CDM.		The	motivations	for	REDD	included	a	sense	that	avoided	forest	loss	might	provide	carbon	sequestration	in	a	less	expensive	–	more	efficient	–	manner	than	other	mechanisms.		In	addition,	one	goal	of	REDD	was	to	enable	more	countries	to	contribute	to	climate	solutions,	reflecting	an	equity	consideration	at	the	country	level.		Not	only	might	those	countries	be	more	integrated	into	climate	policy	decisions,	but	they	could	potentially	capture	global	values	for	emissions	reductions	as	financial	gains.	REDD	can	therefore	be	conceptualized	as	a	policy	mechanism	that	could	not	avoid	issues	of	efficiency	and	equity,	even	where	they	are	not	discussed	explicitly.	2.2 Economic	underpinnings	of	REDD	as	a	payment	for	ecosystem	services	
Trees	sequester	carbon	dioxide	while	growing,	and	thus	can	play	an	important	role	in	mitigating	climate	change,	providing	an	ecosystem	service	–	carbon	sequestration	–	that	historically	has	not	passed	through	markets	and	that	is	not	paid	for	by	the	beneficiaries	of	the	service.	The	Kyoto	protocol,	through	CDM	and	then	REDD,	provided	an	incentive-based	mechanism	for	the	value	of	this	carbon	sequestration,	a	global	public	good,	to	be	realized	by	the	owners	of	tropical	forests	CDM	and	REDD	are	both	based	on	the	relatively	straight	forward	economic	principle	that	private	incentives	to	deforest	and	degrade	forests	can	be	aligned	with	the	social	optimum	through	a	relevant	payment	for	the	ecosystem	service	of	carbon	sequestration.		As	a	PES,	REDD	payments	are	conditionally	based	on	the	amount	of	forest	loss	avoided	due	to	changes	in	land	use	
                                               
1  That number has fallen considerably over the past two decades to somewhere between 
12 and 17% (Van de Werf et al., 2009) as the rate of forest loss has fallen and total GHG 
emissions increased. 
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behavior.		The	promise	of	the	payment	creates	an	incentive	for	that	changed	behavior	of	lower	forest	use.					In	this	vein,	much	of	the	earlier	economics	literature	conceptualised	REDD	as	an	international	payment	for	ecosystem	services	in	which	the	service	provided	was	carbon	sequestration	in	natural	forests.		Those	payments	are	meant	to	incentivize	additional	carbon	storage	that	would	not	have	occurred	without	the	payment	due	to	forest	loss,	whether	deforestation	or	degradation	(detailed	discussions	in	Wunder,	2009;	Pagiola,	2011).			The	role	of	markets	was	highlighted	in	enabling	lower-income	countries	to	realise	the	public	good	value	of	their	natural	forests.	Indeed,	REDD	has	been	described	as	“the	world’s	largest	PES	experiment”	(Corbera,	2012:	p612),	implying	a	role	for	market	transactions,	and	the	commodification	of	forest	ecosystem	services,	specifically	carbon	sequestration.	Such	a	“neoliberal	conservation”	narrative	can	be	found,	for	example,	in	REDD	discussions	in	Brazil	(van	der	Hoff	et	al.,	2015).		Theoretically,	a	PES	involves	a	voluntary	agreement	between	the	owner	of	a	service	and	the	buyer	of	a	service	(Wunder,	2005).	As	an	example,	a	private	landowner	chooses	whether	to	keep	land	as	forest	or	to	convert	it,	perhaps	to	agricultural	land.	If	the	privately	optimal	choice	is	to	deforest,	but	the	socially	optimal	choice	is	not,	then	a	REDD	payment	can	provide	sufficient	incentive	for	the	landowner	to	find	it	optimal	not	to	deforest.	Palmer	et	al.	(2017)	provide	a	classic	model	of	REDD	as	a	voluntary	PES	between	an	individual	private	landowner	and	the	government,	calibrating	their	model	to	Acre	state	in	Brazil.	The	government	will	offer	a	REDD	payment	just	large	enough	that	the	landowner	chooses	to	keep	their	land	as	forest	rather	than	convert	to	the	more	privately	choice	of	agriculture,	but	only	if	that	REDD	payment	is	lower	than	the	value	of	the	additional	carbon	sequestration	due	to	the	avoided	conversion.	For	the	private	landowner,	the	REDD	payment	needs	to	be	just	sufficient	to	make	forest	conservation	more	profitable	than	agricultural	production.	REDD	as	a	PES	therefore	offers	a	win-win	outcome	for	forest	landowners	and	climate	change	mitigation	(Angelsen	et	al.,	2012).		As	such,	the	REDD	payment	is	an	incentive	to	provide	the	public	good,	with	that	incentive	being	large	enough	to	offset	the	foregone	benefits	of	the	next	best	land	use.			2.3 The	realities	of	REDD	as	a	PES	
Where	“landownership	and	carbon	rights	coincide”,	the	implementation	of	REDD	is	relatively	straight	forward	(Corbera	et	al.,	2011:	p302).	For	example,	in	Costa	Rica,	private	ownership	of	forests	stood	at	55%	of	all	forested	area	in	2005.	The	country	has	strongly	supported	a	PES-oriented	approach	to	REDD,	and	initially	required	REDD	to	be	undertaken	only	where	there	is	formal	title	to	the	forestland	(Corbera	et	al.,	2011).	Indeed,	a	number	of	examples,	particularly	in	Latin	American	countries,	follow	this	modality	of	REDD	implementation	fairly	closely,	in	part	because	a	relatively	large	share	of	forest	land	is	owned	by	individuals.		Even	with	ownership,	however,	landowners	engaged	in	a	PES	may	incur	property	rights	enforcement	costs	to	prevent	forest	degradation	by	other	people,	and	those	costs	may	prove	high	enough	to	push	up	the	necessary	payment	or	to	cause	potential	PES	participants	to	drop	out	(Alix-Garcia,	Shapiro,	and	Sims,	2012).	
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Although	the	conceptualisation	of	REDD	as	a	voluntary	PES	is	elegant,	it	does	not	reflect	the	reality	of	much	of	the	forest	loss	that	occurs	in	many	lower-income	country	settings,	whether	deforestation	or	forest	degradation.	For	example,	African	governments	claim	tenure	for	over	94%	of	forested	land	(Romano	and	Reeb,	2008;	Sunderlin	et	al.,	2008;	Rights	and	Resource	Initiative,	2013).	Forest	loss	often	occurs	due	to	neglect	of	a	forest	by	the	government	landowner	rather	than	any	active	land	use	choice.	Instead,	it	is	the	outcome	of	the	uncoordinated	actions	of	many	individuals	with	no	de	jure	ownership	rights	to	the	land.	These	people	have	no	rights	to	convert	the	forest	to	agricultural	land,	or	to	harvest	timber	and	non-timber	products,	which	means	they	have	no	rights	or	authority	to	prevent	such	activities	nor	to	capture	REDD	payments.		The	complexities	of	forest	governance	and	forest	usage	–	who	owns	the	forests,	who	uses	the	forests,	and	who	takes	responsibility	for	the	forests	–	have	proven	central	to	how	REDD	has	been	implemented	and	how	it	has	evolved	since	it	was	first	mooted.	For	example,	the	government	may	own	the	natural	forest	though	neglect	to	manage	it;	nearby	villagers	may	depend	on	the	forest	for	their	livelihoods,	though	any	extraction	is	
de	jure	illegal;	these	villagers	may	have	a	clear	incentive	to	protect	the	forest	but	no	mandate	or	authority;	and	outsiders	may	extract	timber	from,	or	produce	charcoal	in,	the	forest	but	have	no	stake	in	any	REDD	scheme	(Robinson	et	al.,	2014).	In	such	a	situation,	who	has	rights	to	the	carbon,	who	has	rights	to	incentive	payments,	and	how	any	REDD	scheme	is	enforced	are	complex	issues	that	must	be	resolved	before	a	REDD	project	is	implemented.	These	complexities	influence	all	aspects	of	REDD	implementation,	from	monitoring	and	verification,	through	to	funding	mechanisms,	and	including	how	payments	are	shared	amongst	communities.		These	realities	and	complexities	limit	the	broad	application	of	REDD	as	a	pure	PES,	and	have	led	to	modifications	in	REDD’s	goals,	implementation,	and	concept	as	a	PES.		In	the	following	sections	we	explore	these	aspects	of	REDD,	focusing	on	how	they	have	been	addressed	in	the	economics	literature,	and	in	particular	their	implications	for	equity	and	efficiency.	
3 The	costs,	benefits,	and	funding	of	REDD		In	a	voluntary	PES	scheme,	the	benefits	of	introducing	a	market	for	a	particular	ecosystem	service	must	outweigh	the	costs	or	the	transaction	will	not	occur.	Similarly	for	REDD,	the	original	point	of	the	initiative	was	to	provide	a	lower-cost	approach	to	mitigating	climate	change	through	reducing	the	rate	of	forest	loss	in	lower-income	countries.	The	earlier	REDD	literature	identifies	and	estimates	the	costs	of	implementing	REDD	relative	to	the	benefits.	Two	key	conclusions	of	the	literature	are	that	the	full	costs	of	REDD	were	under-estimated	when	REDD	was	first	mooted;	and	determining	who	receives	payments	and	who	bears	the	burdens	from	REDD	is	much	less	simple	than	in	a	classic	PES	between	one	buyer	and	one	seller	of	the	environmental	service.	3.1 REDD	costs	
One	of	the	reasons	that	forest	loss	was	not	included	in	the	1998	Kyoto	Protocol	was	the	recognition	of	how	difficult	(and	implicitly	how	costly)	monitoring,	reporting,	and	verifying	forest	loss	is,	particularly	when	the	measurement	is	against	an	unobservable	
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counterfactual	pathway	(Long	et	al.,	2011;	see	Lederer,	2011,	for	a	detailed	comparison	of	the	costs	and	modalities	of	REDD	versus	CDM	implementation).	Despite	decades	of	evidence	that	slowing	deforestation	proves	difficult,	some	of	the	initial	literature	(for	example,	Stern,	2007;	Eliasch,	2008)	suggested	that	REDD	would	be	a	“low-cost,	rapid-win	solution”	for	climate	change	mitigation	(Lund	et	al.,	2017).	Similarly,	McKinsey	and	Company’s	“Global	Greenhouse	Gas	Abatement	Cost	Curve”	suggested	that	REDD	was	a	relatively	low	cost	approach	to	reducing	emissions,	a	“low	hanging	fruit”.	Many	such	studies	underestimated	or	ignored	several	categories	of	costs	including:	REDD-readiness	costs	that	establish	the	foundation	for	REDD	to	operate,	often	incorporating	the	costs	of	defining	and	establishing	property	rights;	opportunity	costs	that	reflect	economic	and	cultural	values	for	land	beyond	the	oft-used	agricultural	values;	and	on-going	costs	including	monitoring	and	enforcement	costs	in	LIMC	settings.	When	all	the	costs	are	included,	REDD	has	been	found	not	to	be	a	low-cost	approach	to	climate	change	mitigation,	but,	instead,	rather	costly	and	imperfect.		
REDD	readiness	If	REDD	represents	a	market	contract	between	buyers	and	sellers	of	carbon	credits,	then	rights	to	carbon	must	be	well	defined,	and	proper	measurement	is	essential.	Such	measurement	must	include	an	inventory	of	carbon	stocks,	a	methodology	for	determining	the	likely	trajectory	of	forest	loss	without	any	REDD	initiative	–	the	counterfactual,	in	addition	to	the	rate	of	forest	loss	with	the	initiative.	Therefore	in	the	early	stages	of	REDD	design	and	implementation,	as	reflected	in	the	literature,	considerable	attention	was	paid	to	countries	being	in	a	position	to	accept	REDD	funding	in	exchange	for	a	verified	reduction	in	forest-based	emissions	relative	to	a	measurable	and	verifiable	baseline,	accounting	for	leakage,	all	to	ensure	additionality.	Much	of	the	attention	to	carbon	inventories	can	be	found	in	the	science	literature,	for	example,	Gibbs	et	al,	2007;	Goetz	et	al.,	2009;	Keith	et	al.,	2009;	Saatchi	et	al.,	2011).	Determining	credible	baseline	scenarios	requires	attention	to	past	rates	of	forest	loss	and	anticipated	future	forest	loss	without	REDD,	the	business	as	usual	baseline,	and	has	proven	challenging.	Havemann	(2009)	and	Angelsen	(2008c)	focus	their	attention	on	baselines,	measuring,	and	monitoring.	These	costs	are	associated	with	REDD	“readiness”,	and	countries	have	discovered	the	high	set	up	costs	of	being	able	to	“monitor,	report,	and	verify”	(MRV)	the	rate	of	forest	loss	relative	to	an	unmeasurable	counterfactual	trajectory	of	forest	loss	(Lund	et	al.,	2017).	Using	data	from	Laos,	Mertz	et	al.	(2017)	highlight	the	costs	and	difficulties	of	establishing	forest	reference	levels	that	are	required	for	payments	that	reward	“avoided”	forest	loss.	Sloan	and	Pelletier	(2012)	provide	an	example	of	using	detailed	spatial	modelling	based	on	historical	trends.	Yet	forest	transitions	are	rarely	linear	(Angelsen,	2008a),	and	indeed	Sloan	and	Pelletier	(2012:	p441)	highlight	that	“the	complexity	of	forest-cover	change	renders	the	reliability	of	even	the	‘best’	spatially	projected	baseline	indefinite.”		
Pagiola and Bosquet (2009) similarly explore different dimensions of REDD implementation 
costs. They highlight the opportunity cost of not converting forest into agricultural land, 
including loss of a source of timber; implementation costs that include prevention of illegal 
logging, or the relocation of timber harvesting activities; and transactions costs, that include 
negotiating contracts, and monitoring, reporting, and verifying emissions reductions. In 
paying considerable attention to the opportunity cost of REDD Pagiola and Bosquet (2009) 
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further show how to build a “national supply curve for REDD.” Olsen and Bishop (2009) 
detail the actual costs to investors of REDD.	
On-going	costs	REDD	proponents	and	the	literature	consistently	ignore	or	undervalue	costs	of	enforcing	access	restrictions	that	must	be	incurred	to	generate	avoided	deforestation.		Such	enforcement	requires	ongoing	expenditure	for	the	life	of	any	REDD	project	(Börner	et	al.,	2011,	2014).	Several	situations	create	particular	problems	with	enforcement	costs.		First,	in	settings	where	forests	communities	use	forests,	often	with	poorly	defined	de	facto	rights,	the	government	owner	of	the	land	must	choose	to	enforce	against	that	local	use	or	to	find	mechanisms	for	the	community	to	receive	payments	as	the	incentive.		Second,	in	settings	in	which	the	local	communities	have	defined	rights	and	participate	in	REDD,	“outsiders”	who	traditionally	used	a	now-REDD	forest	do	not	share	in	any	REDD	payments	or	associated	benefits	(Albers	and	Robinson,	2013;	Robinson	et	al.,	2014).		REDD	implementation	requires	communities	to	develop	group	self-enforcement	mechanisms	with	both	upfront	transactions	costs	and	ongoing	enforcement	costs.	In	addition,	the	communities	face	ongoing	enforcement	costs	to	prevent	outsider	extraction	in	settings	with	outsiders	as	important	drivers	of	forest	loss	or	develop	mechanisms	to	share	payments	with	those	people	to	create	an	incentive	for	lower	forest	use.		These	situations	create	the	potential	for	costly	conflict	–	an	often	ignored	cost	–	as	some	individuals	lose	access	to	the	forest	but	are	not	compensated	through	the	REDD	initiative	or	any	other	source	(Douglas	and	Simula,	2011;	Kane	et	al.	2017).	Rakatama	et	al.	(2017)	provides	a	comprehensive	review	of	REDD	costs	for	60	studies.	They	find	that	the	literature	continues	to	focus	on	opportunity	costs	(56	comparable	estimates),	with	less	than	half	the	sample	addressing	transactions	and	implementation	costs,	suggesting	that	the	cost	effectiveness	of	REDD	projects	is	thus	inflated.	Those	who	have	looked	for	the	“hidden	costs”	of	REDD	have	found	them	to	be	high.	Alston	and	Andersson	(2011)	provide	a	detailed	discussion	of	further	transactions	costs	of	REDD,	focusing	on	negotiating	contracts	with	landowners,	monitoring	outcomes,	and	enforcing	contracts,	which	take	the	mechanism	a	long	way	from	the	Coasean	ideal	of	a	PES.	Many	of	these	costs	must	be	incurred	after	a	country	is	“REDD	ready”.	They	highlight	the	costs	imposed	on	LMIC	governments	with	respect	to	monitoring	contractual	behavior.	Arguably,	treating	incentives	for	monitoring,	reporting,	and	verification	has	proven	difficult	in	part	because	buyers	and	sellers	of	carbon	credits	have	incentives	not	to	monitor	closely	(see	Richards	and	Andersson,	2001;	Alston	and	Andersson,	2011).	Luttrell	et	al.	(2018)	consider	costs	associated	with	22	subnational	REDD	initiatives	and	the	extent	to	which	the	costs	of	implementing	REDD	borne	by	those	in	LMICs	outweigh	REDD	carbon	payments.	The	authors	consider	start	up	and	running	costs,	including	MRV,	free	prior	informed	consent,	and	enforcement	costs,	in	addition	to	the	direct	payment	for	the	ecosystem	service.	They find that a	significant	portion	of	subnational	and	local	institutions	incur	high	costs	of	REDD+,	particularly	at	the	startup	phase.	
Luttrell et al. (2018) further	address	the	institutional	motivation	behind	REDD	participation	and	cost	burdening.	For	example	a	greater	number	of	implementing	organisations	will	have	their	costs	covered	if	sustainable	forest	management	and	certification	are	implemented	as	a	core	strategy.	
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Dealing	with	forest	degradation	Forest	degradation	has	proven	more	costly	to	measure	than	deforestation,	and	the	counter-factual	level	of	degradation	is	similarly	difficult	to	determine.	As	a	consequence,	some	REDD	initiatives	ignore	degradation	(monitoring	and	verification)	and	focus	on	deforestation.	This	was	the	case	for	a	number	of	REDD	pilots	in	Tanzania	(Robinson	et	al.,	2013,	provide	detail;	see	also	Gullison	et	al.,	2007;	Kindermann	et	al.,	2008).Yet,	degradation	has	been	estimated	to	account	for	20%	of	forest	emissions	in	Brazil’s	Amazon	forest,	around	two-thirds	of	forest	loss	in	Indonesia,	and	approximately	one-third	of	forest	loss	in	African	countries	(Murdiyarso	et	al.,	2008).		Ignoring	degradation	could	be	more	problematic	still	if	reduced	deforestation	leads	to	leakage	through	degradation.	In	this	case	leakage	may	be	under-estimated	and	the	impact	of	REDD	on	carbon	sequestration	over-estimated	(Delacote	and	Angelsen,	2015,	explore	this	possibility	theoretically).		Technological	advances	have	enabled	more	cost-effective	remote	monitoring	of	degradation	(Thompson	et	al.,	2013	provide	an	operational	framework).	However,	there	has	also	been	increasing	recognition	of	the	validity	of	community-based	measurement	and	assessment	of	forest	degradation	(Skutsch	et	al.,	2009;	Palmer,	2011).		3.2 Cost	Effectiveness:	Additionality	and	leakage		
For	REDD	payments	to	be	efficient,	they	must	induce	additional	carbon	storage	and	the	amount	of	carbon	stored	must	be	net	of	leakage	of	forest	loss	to	other	areas	(Gregersen	et	al.,	2010:	p1).	When	a	REDD	initiative	is	as	a	voluntary	contract	between	the	government	or	a	private	investor	and	an	individual	landowner	who	makes	an	explicit	decision	whether	or	not	to	convert	forest,	there	will	only	be	an	exchange	if	the	payment	to	the	landowner	outweighs	the	various	costs	of	implementing	REDD.		That	central	tenet	is	not	enough	for	efficiency	because	the	payment	is	inefficient	to	the	extent	that	the	landowner	might	have	conserved	the	forest	without	the	REDD	scheme’s	incentive;	the	payment	must	incentivize	additional	carbon	storage.	The	empirical	literature	discusses	the	extent	of	additionality.	In	Costa	Rica,	where	some	of	the	earliest	payments	for	reduced	forest	loss	have	been	implemented,	there	was	almost	no	additionality	from	forest	owners	(Sanchez-Azofeira	et	al.,	2007;	Robalino	et	al,	2008;	Alston	and	Andersson,	2011).			Leakage	is	“any	additional	deforestation,	forest	degradation,	or	carbon	emissions	that	occur	outside	of	the	REDD	policy	area	in	reaction	to	that	REDD	policy	or	project”	(Albers	and	Robinson,	2013:	p83).	If	the	activities	that	were	leading	to	forest	loss	have	merely	been	displaced	elsewhere	rather	than	curtailed,	the	REDD	initiative	provides	less	net	reductions	in	emissions	overall.	Theoretical	analyses	identify	when	and	where	leakage	might	occur,	focusing	in	part	on	the	role	of	markets	(for	example	Robinson	et	al.,	2011).	Atmadja	and	Verchot	(2012)	provide	a	review	of	the	empirical	realities	and	practicalities	of	leakage	and	REDD	across	15	studies,	focusing	on	project-level	leakage.	They	detail	four	components	of	leakage,	emissions,	displacement,	attribution,	and	quantification;	two	categories,	activity	and	market;	and	scales	of	intervention	and	displacement.	They	find	forest-based	leakage	from	deforestation	and	degradation	to	be	greater	than	40%,	but	recognize	that	the	number	of	studies	on	leakage	is	small.	
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Localised	REDD	schemes	that	allow	individual	and	communities	to	sell	carbon	credits	to	an	emissions	trading	scheme	are	particularly	at	risk	of	leakage.	In	contrast,	national-level	schemes	can	eliminate	at	least	within	country	leakage,	though	leakage	across	countries	is	always	a	possibility.	Thus	scale	of	implementation,	the	method	of	funding,	and	leakage	are	closely	linked.		3.3 Benefits	and	beneficiaries	of	REDD				
A	classic	PES	requires	well-defined	property	rights,	though	following	Coase,	the	allocation	of	property	rights	is	less	important	than	the	definition	and	enforcement	of	those	rights.	For	REDD,	the	distribution	of	costs	and	benefits	is	a	critical	element	of	the	mechanism,	not	just	for	issues	of	equity	and	climate	justice,	but	also	for	anticipating	the	success	of	any	particular	REDD	initiative.	
The	importance	of	land	property	rights	in	REDD	Property	rights	institutions	influence	many	aspects	of	both	the	efficiency	and	equity	of	REDD.	First,	in	the	LIMCs	where	REDD	is	being	implemented,	property	rights	might	variously	be	allocated	to	national	governments,	individual	landowners,	or	communities,	which	create	different	pathways	and	obstacles	to	efficient	REDD.		In	addition,	the	property	rights	are	frequently	ill	defined	or	poorly	supported	by	other	institutions.		In	addition,	many	people	who	are	harmed	by	a	REDD	initiative	have	no	rights	to	any	REDD	payments	but	face	much-reduced	access	to	important	resources.		“As	long	as	tenure	remains	insecure,	PES	programs	are	very	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	implement”	(Pagiola,	2011:	p8).		The	need	to	clarify	forest	property	rights	has	similarly	been	recognized	by	REDD	practitioners	(for	an	early	but	comprehensive	discussion	of	forest	tenure	rights	and	REDD,	see	Sunderlin	et	al.,	2009).	Several	authors	have	noted	the	difficulty	of	paying	individuals	for	reduced	access	to	forests	when	that	access	has	been	illegal.	For	example,	this	aspect	of	payments	has	been	an	issue	in	Mexico	where	deforestation	is	illegal	unless	the	land	owner	has	a	land	use	change	permit	(Skutsch	et	al.,	2017).	In	Tanzania,	Tanzania	Forest	Conservation	Group	has	helped	villages	engaged	in	REDD	pilot	projects	to	apply	for	village	land	certificates	and	establish	village	land	registries	to	formalize	land	tenure	(Dokken	et	al.,	2014).	Yet	Sunderlin	et	al.	(2018)	assess	21	subnational	initiatives	across	five	countries,	including	Tanzania,	and	find	that	only	in	Cameroon	is	there	evidence	that	REDD	has	significantly	reduced	tenure	insecurity,	though	rarely	has	it	worsened	smallholder	tenure	insecurity.		For	REDD,	the	fact	that	in	many	countries	the	de	jure	(often	the	government)	and	de	
facto	(often	local	communities)	owners	or	managers	of	forests	differ	from	each	other	implies	that	“ownership	is	ill-defined,	contested,	or	insecure”	(B.	Robinson	et	al.,	2014:	p281).	That	communities	own,	use,	or	manage	forests	further	complicates	property	rights	definitions.		Thus	the	issue	of	land	tenure	and	property	rights	--	who	owns	the	land	and	the	carbon	sequestered	on	that	land	--	looms	large	across	the	REDD	literature	(e.g.	Alston	and	Andersson,	2011).	A	review	article	by	B.	Robinson	et	al.	(2014),	though	not	focused	specifically	on	REDD,	finds	36	publications	that	link	empirically	land	cover	
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change	to	tenure,	and	support	Sunderlin	et	al.’s	(2014)	conclusion	that	tenure	security	is	particularly	important	for	communities	to	participate	in	REDD	initiatives.		Efficiency	at	the	Government	level	can	create	equity	concerns.	Whether	REDD	has	reversed	efforts	of	countries	to	devolve	ownership	and	management	of	forests	to	the	communities	that	depend	on	them	has	featured	large	in	the	REDD	literature.	Given	that	REDD	strategies	are	arguably	best	developed	at	a	national	level,	a	concern	is	that	governments	will	want	to	re-assert	their	control	over	forests	so	as	to	have	more	control	over	carbon	sequestration.	Similarly,	the	issue	of	leakage	is	linked	to	concerns	that	REDD	might	push	countries	to	reverse	recent	efforts	to	devolve	ownership	and	management	of	forests	and	lead	to	the	recentralization	of	forest	governance	(Phelps	et	al.,	2010).	Recentralisation	of	forests	can	make	it	easier	for	governments	to	implement	national	REDD	programmes,	whether	through	minimising	leakage,	or	using	REDD	funds	to	address	the	drivers	of	forest	loss	rather	than	channelling	funds	to	local	forest-dependent	communities.	Linked	to	this	point,	REDD	can	also	create	the	incentive	for	governments	to	protect	forests	at	the	expense	of	villagers	who	have	traditionally	replied	on	these	forests	(Torpey-Saboe	et	al.,	2015).		
Benefit	sharing	at	the	community	level	Luttrell	et	al.	(2013)	place	benefit	sharing	as	a	central	design	element	of	REDD	because	how	payments	are	allocated	determines	the	required	incentives	for	people	to	reduce	their	emissions.	Similarly,	the	issue	of	property	rights	becomes	more	important	and	complex	when	implementing	REDD	at	the	scale	of	the	community.	Palmer	(2010)	writes	explicitly	of	the	need	for	the	creation	of	“common	property	carbon	rights”,	given	how	many	REDD	initiatives	(and	planned	initiatives)	are	located	in	areas	where	forests	are	held	under	common	property	regimes.	 Robinson	et	al.	(2016)	document	a	REDD	pilot	scheme	in	Tanzania	implemented	at	the	group	level	to	mimic	a	PES	in	which	payments	should	be	conditional	on	carbon	loss	avoided	and	valued	according	to	prices	in	the	carbon	markets.	The	payment	is	made	to	the	community,	reflecting	the	value	of	the	avoided	carbon	emissions,	and	each	member	of	the	community	receives	an	equal	share	of	that	payment,	regardless	of	the	costs	that	REDD	imposes	on	that	particular	individual	and	on	that	individual’s	reduction	of	forest	use.	Certainly,	some	individuals	will	be	harmed	differentially	by	the	constraints	imposed	by	the	REDD	scheme.	As	such,	the	approach	promotes	commitment	to	a	shared	and	more	equitable	future	rather	than	to	individual	incentives	for	forest	use	change.	Somerville	et	al.	(2010)	find	in	Madagascar	that	“community-based PES schemes offer 
a particular challenge, as incentives aimed to influence individual behavior . . . pass 
through community institutions” (p.1263). Mahanty	et	al.	(2013)	assess	seven	REDD	schemes	set	up	as	PES,	across	Africa,	Asia,	and	Latin	America,	from	a	total	of	44	candidate	REDD	PES	schemes.	They	find	formally	recgonised	use	rights	to	be	sufficient	for	communities	to	undertake	REDD	through	a	PES	agreement	in	Mexico	and	Mozambique.	However,	they	also	found	that	upfront	and	opportunity	costs	were	night	compared	to	the	PES	payments.	Mahanty	et	al.	(2013)	document	various	modalities	for	how	PES	funds	are	distributed	within	communities,	from	collective	contracts,	similar	to	
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Robinson	et	al.	(2016)	example	from	Tanzania,	through	to	payments	to	individual	contract	owners	and	to	community	trust	funds.	3.4 Funding	REDD			
The	complexities	of	REDD	funding,	as	documented	in	the	literature,	are	linked	to	the	complexities	of	implementing	REDD	(Blom	et	al.,	2010).	Two	stages	of	funding	have	been	identified	in	the	literature.	The	first,	funding	for	“readiness”	activities	described	above	almost	always	relies	on	public	funds,	as	upfront	payments	are	needed	to	enable	countries	and	communities	to	build	the	needed	capacity	to	be	in	a	position	to	link	funding	to	verified	reductions	in	emissions	and	to	cover	the	costs	of	being	REDD	ready.	The	second	stage	of	funding	links	to	the	payment	for	the	emissions	reductions	and	the	costs	of	protecting	the	REDD	forests.		The	broad	financial	options	to	support	REDD	include	fund	based,	market	based,	or	a	mixture	of	both	(Cerbu	et	al.,	2010),	with	funding	linked	to	the	implementation	of	REDD	activities	as	the	basis	for	a	performance-based	payments	at	the	national	level	(Skutsch	et	al.,	2017).	Individual	lower-income	countries	would	choose	how	to	achieve	the	contracted	amount	of	reduced	forest	loss	and	how	to	distribute	national-level	payments,	through	a	mix	of	national	and	sub-national	level	policies.	These	policies	could	be	ex	post	performance	based	or	could	employ	other	policies	to	reduce	emissions.	The	reality	has	resulted	in	complex	layered	approaches,	some	of	which	resemble	PES	and	others	that	do	not	(Pedroni	et	al.,	2009).	Market-based	mechanisms	could	link	forest	owners	in	lower-income	countries	looking	to	sell	REDD	credits	with	higher-income	countries	looking	to	offset	their	industrial	carbon	emissions.	Yet	the	emerging	reality	has	been	rather	different,	with	very	few	initiatives	able	to	sell	carbon	credits	(Lund	et	al.,	2017).	Indeed,	carbon	markets	have	played	a	very	small	role	in	REDD,	despite	REDD’s	origins	as	a	market-based	mechanism.	The	European	Emissions	Trading	System,	for	example,	does	not	accept	REDD	credits,	and	other	carbon	markets	may	follow	suit	(Boucher,	2015).	Some	REDD	pilot	projects	have	explicitly	looked	to	engage	directly	with	carbon	markets,	including	a	number	of	pilots	set	up	by	TFCG/MJUMITA	in	Tanzania	(Manyika	et	al.,	2013;	Robinson	et	al.,	2013).	However,	problems	with	verification	of	avoided	carbon,	and	the	relatively	low	price	of	carbon	in	the	voluntary	markets,	mean	that	the	villages	have	not	been	able	to	trade	in	the	carbon	markets	and	so	have	relied	on	dedicated	funds	that	mimic	the	markets	(Vatn	et	al.,	2017).	One	key	concern	with	regards	to	funding	REDD	through	carbon	markets	has	been	that	REDD	credits	could	flood	the	market	and	depress	the	carbon	price	yet	further	(Neeff	and	Ascui,	2009;	Skutsch	and	McCall,	2010).	Angelsen	et	al.	(2014)	addresses	how	this	risk	might	be	minimized.		The	reality	is,	however,	that	most	of	the	hundreds	of	REDD	projects	undertaken	so	far	have	been	funded	through	dedicated	multilateral	and	bilateral	agreements	(Fletcher	et	al.,	2016).	
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3.5 Efficiency,	equity,	and	ancillary	benefits		
The	choice	of	funding	mechanism	is	closely	linked	to	the	extent	to	which	REDD	will	generate	rents	for	lower-income	countries	and	particularly	communities	living	near	to	designated	REDD	forests,	or	whether	is	designed	to	compensate	individuals	for	the	costs	that	REDD	imposes	(Karsenty	et	al.,	2014).	Thus	funding	is	closely	linked	to	issues	of	equity	and	efficiency.	If	REDD	is	implemented	as	a	PES,	then	linking	REDD	to	carbon	trading	might	be	a	natural	next	step	(for	an	early	discussion,	see	Laurance,	2008)	with	efficient	funding	through	an	international	market	for	carbon	credits	with	direct	payments	to	forest	owners,	whether	individuals	or	groups	(Angelsen	et	al.,	2012).	In	such	a	situation,	the	forest	users	would	be	paid	the	value	of	avoided	carbon	emissions	and	would	engage	in	such	contracts	whenever	that	value	more	than	offsets	the	cost	imposed	by	fREDD.	There	have	been	suggestions	that	if	the	only	concern	for	REDD	were	reduced	carbon	emissions,	then	a	carbon-efficient	REDD	would,	for	example,	target	commercial	farming	and	ranching	in	many	Latin	American	countries.	Skutch	et	al.,	(2017)	suggest	that	the	benefits	from	avoided	deforestation	in	such	circumstances	are	likely	to	be	high,	the	costs	of	implementation	relatively	low,	yet	such	an	efficiency	focus	would	direct	REDD	funds	towards	relatively	richer	households	in	lower-income	countries.	Alternatively,	focusing	on	reducing	deforestation	caused	by	shifting	cultivation	would	be	more	likely	to	direct	REDD	funds	towards	poorer	farmers,	but	the	costs	of	administering	REDD	in	such	circumstances	where	many	smallholder	farmers	are	involved,	are	likely	to	be	high,	suggesting	that	such	a	focus	could	be	pro-poor	but	relatively	inefficient	(Skutch	et	al.,	2017).		In	Tanzania,	many	REDD	projects	are	being	implemented	locally	through	community-based	forest	management-type	structures.	This	approach	can	increase	the	likelihood	of	ancillary	community	benefits.	However,	REDD	could	be	implemented	in	government	forests	designated	as	important	for	species	and	biodiversity	conservation,	where	villagers	are	already	excluded,	if	imperfectly.	In	such	cases	REDD	could	provide	ancillary	ecosystem	benefits	at	a	relatively	low	implementation	cost	(Forest	trends,	2009;	Robinson	et	al.,	2013).		REDD	has	been	coopted	to	also	improve	forest-dependent	livelihoods,	biodiversity,	and	to	contribute	towards	sustainable	development	(Busch	et	al.,	2011;	Peterson	et	al.,	2012).	However,	Phelps	et	al.	(2012)	caution	that	policy	makers	will	face	trade	offs	where	high	carbon	and	high	biodiversity	forests	do	not	overlap	geographically	(see	also	Torres	et	al.,	2015).	There	is	scientific	evidence	that	biodiversity	conservation	is	needed	if	forest	carbon	stores	are	to	be	sustained	(Diaz	et	al.,	2009),	suggesting	the	linkages	between	carbon	sequestration	and	biodiversity	are	complex.	
4 Future	REDD	The	Paris	Agreement	has	“revived	attention	to	REDD”	(Sunderlin	et	al.,	2018).	Yet	in	a	post-Paris	COP	world,	it	is	not	clear	how	REDD	will	evolve,	and	more	broadly,	the	extent	to	which	or	how	natural	forests	will	continue	to	be	explicitly	included	in	climate	agreements	through	REDD	initiatives.	Critiques	of	REDD	are	many	and	varied.	Some	of	the	earlier	critiques	originated	from	a	“moral”	stance:	should	higher-income	countries	
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be	able	to	offset	their	emissions	with	support	for	lower-income	forests	through	carbon	markets.	Others	highlight	objections	to	the	commodification	of	nature	and	REDD	as	a	market-based	instrument	(Fletcher	et	al.,	2016).	Other	critiques	are	oriented	towards	the	reality	of	REDD	playing	out	very	differently	from	the	concept,	often	due	to	the	under-estimation	of	how	costly	REDD	would	be.	Still	others	point	to	the	co-opting	of	REDD	onto	the	causes	of	biodiversity	conservation,	poverty	reduction,	and	sustainable	development,	thus	diluting	the	original	concept	that	REDD	is	about	climate	change	and	reducing	carbon	emissions.		REDD	has	been	accused	of	being	a	“green	grab”	(Fairhead	et	al.,	2012),	an	excuse	to	dispossess	local	peoples.	Despite	these	criticisms	REDD,	most	likely,	is	not	dead.	However,	one	can	perhaps	find	in	the	literature	a	consensus	emerging	that	REDD	is	imperfect,	imprecise,	and	implemented	in	a	myriad	of	ways.	Concern	has	been	voiced	in	the	literature	that	REDD	has	not	lived	up	to	its	expectations.		Angelsen	et	al.	(2017)	suggests	that	REDD	has	not	delivered	the	tangible	results	that	were	expected	of	it,	and	raises	important	issues	with	respect	to	how	REDD	has	evolved	over	time.	The	reality	of	many	REDD	schemes	is	that	they	have	moved	far	from	the	ideals	of	a	PES	scheme,	whether	with	respect	to	the	voluntary	aspect	of	PES,	or	with	respect	to	the	idea	that	payments	are	for	results	rather	than	effort.	For	example,	Skutsch	et	al.	(2017)	propose	upfront	“fair	compensation”	as	more	appropriate	than	ex	post	results-based	payments.			Many	REDD	initiatives	are	occurring	at	the	individual	community	or	forest	level,	and	resemble	earlier	efforts	to	protect	forests,	such	as	ICDPs,	Integrated	Conservation	and	Development	Programmes	and	participatory	forest	management	(Blom	et	al.,	2010).	Indeed,	though	REDD	was	initially	developed	explicitly	as	a	carbon	mitigation	tool	that	places	an	economic	value	on	forest	carbon	sequestration	in	lower-income	countries,	REDD,	and	particularly	its	manifestation	as	REDD+	is	increasingly	conceptualised	as	in	the	context	of	sustainable	development	(van	der	Hoff	et	al.,	2015).	Turnhout	et	al.	(2017)	suggests	that	a	“heterodox	REDD+	may	provide	building	blocks	for	the	polycentric	governance	of	the	world’s	remaining	tropical	forests”.			This	morphing	of	REDD	away	from	its	initial	conceptualization	towards	a	local	forest	management	approach	is	likely	to	dilute	its	impact	on	climate	change	and	increase	the	complexity	of	implementation.	It	also	seems	to	move	REDD	far	from	where	efforts	to	stem	forest	loss	might	start	from:	an	understanding	of	the	drivers	of	forest	loss,	many	of	which	are	external	to	the	forest	sector.	Most	of	the	attention	of	REDD,	and	so	the	REDD	literature,	is	focused	squarely	on	the	forest	sector,	and	much	attention	is	on	protecting	the	sector	rather	than	reducing	the	external	pressures.	Robinson	et	al.	(2013)	highlight	the	need	to	take	into	account	whether	the	drivers	of	forest	loss	are	internal	or	external	to	a	particular	forest	landscape,	when	determining	the	best	approach	to	implementing	REDD.	If	the	drivers	are	external	but	efforts	are	focused	on	a	particular	set	of	forests,	REDD	is	in	danger	of	“becom[ing]	an	enforcement	programme	that	faces	similar	issues	to	all	previous	“fence	and	fine”	deforestation	prevention	programmes”	(Robinson	et	al.,	2013:	p142).	
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